The Enduring Legacy of Forced Division: Welfare Nationalism in Germany and South Korea

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April 30, 2024

Abstract

What can welfare attitudes tell us about nationalism in divided societies? This article uses the concept of welfare nationalism to explain the opposition to extending welfare benefits to perceived out-groups within the same nation and ethnic group, expanding on the concepts of welfare chauvinism and ethnocentrism to encompass intra-ethnic and intra-national exclusion. Through a comparative experimental approach analyzing public attitudes in Germany and South Korea, the research finds opposition to providing state support to individuals from politically or historically divided groups within the same nation: Eastern Germans in Germany and North Koreans in South Korea. These findings highlight the deep-seated impact of national divisions on social policy support, with discrimination based on national identity distinctions and the emergence of a fissured sense of ethnic identity.

Keywords: national identity, welfare chauvinism, experiments, Germany, South Korea

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1 Introduction

What can welfare attitudes tell us about nationalism in divided societies? Welfare chauvinism explains natives' opposition to granting welfare benefits or social assistance to immigrants, and welfare ethnocentricism explains opposition to the extension of benefits to ethnic minorities. Both concepts lie at the intersection of social policy and socio-political attitudes, characterized by the belief that welfare benefits should be restricted to specific groups within a nation on the basis of nativity, ethnicity, or citizenship status. However, the concept fails to explain intra-national forms of exclusion. In contexts where ethnic differences are notionally minimal or absent, the exclusion underscores a form of chauvinism grounded in national (or regional) division rather than citizenship, ethnic, or racial differentiation. Building on the welfare chauvinism literature, we argue the concept of "welfare nationalism" better and more accurately describes this specific kind of in-group versus out-group dynamic. The rise of national separatism in many parts of the developed world including Europe and North America, and the ubiquity of ethnic groups divided by borders points to empirical and theoretical relevance of potential conational exclusionism and fissured ethnic identities.

We use a comparative experimental approach to explore welfare nationalism, employing a choice-based conjoint to investigate public attitudes in Germany and South Korea regarding state-provided employment training support to working-class residents in these countries. Survey respondents evaluate hypothetical profiles based on individual attributes, including origin, age, and occupation, to determine their support preferences. This method shows the individual and combined influence of these attributes on decision-making, focusing on the main quantity of interest: the candidates' origin.

Germany and South Korea are ideal cases for studying welfare nationalism because they present scenarios where welfare attitudes can be examined independently of national, ethnic, or racial differences. In both societies, national division is understood as having created distinct 'in-group' and 'out-group' dynamics within an otherwise shared national framework. Thus, they are ideal for exploring how historical and political divisions impact contemporary

attitudes toward social policies.

The results show that candidates who originate from Eastern Germany or North Korea are significantly less preferred by South Koreans and Western Germans, respectively. Social discrimination is extreme against those of North Korean origin, but the persistence of discrimination against Eastern Germans by those in the West underscores the enduring effects of national division. This division is not based on ethnicity but on perceived differences in national identity among a nominally the same group. These distinctions lead to a form of chauvinism that advocates for prioritizing welfare benefits for those deemed part of the "true" nation, thereby excluding those from the perceived "other" regions within the same national borders. Notably, we find that Western German discrimination towards those from Eastern Germany abates among younger Western Germans – those who came of age under a unified Germany.

No such change is observed for younger South Koreans towards their northern compatriots – division remains in effect territoriality. In fact, supplementary analysis indicates that South Koreans with a strong ethnic identity are more likely to exclude non-native co-ethnics, giving rise to a distinct South Korean ethnic nationalism. This is evidence of a civic, constitutional and territorial idea of a divided nation merging with ethnic ideas to exclude groups from the same ethnic group even after national division has been resolved. Primordial pretensions notwithstanding, one nation has become two, not just in civic and territorial terms, but ethnically as well.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we situate the research question in the welfare chauvinism literature and underscore the specific gap we seek to fill in this literature. We also contextualize the cases chosen and explain the logic of the case selection. Then, we review the choice-based conjoint research method and its design, explaining why the method has construct validity and is designed to accurately measure the theoretical concepts it is intended to assess. We then report findings from the experiments run in Germany and South Korea. The paper concludes with a discussion of the significance of our findings,

entertains alternative explanations and potential criticisms, and reviews the research's main contributions.

2 Literature Review

2.1 From Welfare Chauvinism to Welfare Nationalism

The study of welfare nationalism extends our understanding of social discrimination by examining how national identity and nationalism impact welfare policy preferences, particularly in an era marked by significant global migration and the growing diversification of national communities. This literature review synthesizes foundational concepts from welfare chauvinism and ethnocentrism and then moves to welfare nationalism, contextualizing it within this study. Furthermore, it examines the implications of social discrimination and attitudes towards migrants and ethnic minorities, and the dynamics of national identity in shaping welfare policies.

The study of attitudes toward welfare provision to minority groups has seen the development of two broad concepts: welfare chauvinism and welfare ethnocentrism. The first, originally conceptualized by Andersen and Bjørklund (1990, 212), generally connotes an exclusionary attitude toward immigrants who are an ethnic outgroup (Careja and Harris 2022). The second, a more recently developed concept connotes exclusionary attitudes toward well-established ethnic minorities (Ford 2016). Both these concepts have helped to focus research efforts on how majority in-groups seek to exclude ethnic minority out-groups from welfare provision. Such attitudes aligns closely with right-wing authoritarian ideologies, which tend to portray migrants as the 'other'—differing in race, ethnicity, or religion, and thus perceived as less deserving of social benefits (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Kitschelt and McGann 1995).

Research conducted across various European and North American contexts substantiates the presence of exclusionary tendencies in attitudes toward welfare policy. Studies find a pronounced tendency among majority groups to limit access to welfare services based on race,

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religion, and ethnicity, particularly in regions experiencing substantial immigration (Mewes and Mau 2012; Kootstra 2016; Donnelly 2021). Moreover, contemporary studies highlight the normalization of such discriminatory attitudes in public opinion, shaping policies that curtail welfare benefits to perceived out-groups (Wiggen 2022; Bell, Valenta, and Strabac 2023). In Western Europe, the perception of an 'ethnic threat' and racial difference partially accounts for welfare chauvinistic attitudes, suggesting that concerns over cultural and social cohesion drive resistance to inclusive welfare policies (Kootstra 2016; Kros and Coenders 2019).

Conceptually, distinguishing between hostility toward immigrant ethnic others and other ethnic minority groups is also necessary. Its examination is becoming increasingly critical in contexts characterized by growing ethnic diversity and the presence of large, established ethnic minority communities spanning several generations (Haas, Castles, and Miller 2020). Thus, welfare ethnocentrism extends the discussion focusing on the role of perceived ethnic threats in shaping welfare exclusionary attitudes. Research finds that opposition to welfare entitlements is extended to well-established ethnic minority groups for whom migration status is not immediately relevant or does not apply, hence the concept of welfare ethnocentrism (Ford 2016; also see Kinder and Kam 2010).

However, there are limits to what the concepts of welfare chauvinism and ethnocentrism can account for. As the theoretical clarity and empirical rigor in studying exclusionary attitudes have improved, additional anomalous but important phenomena have become visible. Discriminatory views of deservingness with respect to welfare can also apply to coethnics (Denney, Ward, and Green 2023; He 2022; Tsuda 2022; Ward and Denney 2022). This literature indicates that such dynamics may apply to both long-established groups in the country (internal migrants in the case of China) and immigrants (in the case of coethnic return migration in Japan and Korea). The literature is entirely focused on East Asia, however, and it is unclear whether such findings can ber replicated in other countries. Further, the term 'welfare chauvinism' is used, even though conceptually, welfare chauvinism generally

connotes exclusionary attitudes toward migrants who are also ethnic outsiders.

Hence, to overcome these studies' conceptual limitations, we suggest a different concept that captures the co-ethnic exclusionism found in existing studies. We use the concept of welfare nationalism, which claims that nationalism and constructs of national identity influence welfare policy preferences. Welfare nationalism, as we use it here, diverges from the concepts of welfare chauvinism and ethnocentrism by emphasizing divisions rooted in national or regional affiliations within a nation. Our adoption of welfare nationalism aims to broaden its application beyond its typical association with "national interests" (Suszycki, 2011; Keskinen, 2016), a perspective that, while valid, often confines the term to a somewhat limited conceptualization.

Instead, we propose a nuanced understanding of welfare nationalism that recognizes it as a potential tool for both highlighting and addressing the nuanced challenges of social cohesion and national unity. In these instances, discrimination stems from perceived differences in national identity and status, which engenders a form of exclusionism aimed at reserving welfare benefits for those deemed part of the "authentic" or "real" nation(-state). We also note that ethnonationalist views and welfare exclusionary attitudes can, paradoxically, exist alongside one another, as fissures in the original ethnic identity may emerge due to national divisions. Our usage contrasts with other applications, including discussions of welfare as a means by which to advance region-based nationalist independence movements (McEwen 2002; 2006; Béland and Lecours 2006), and other uses that largely utilize the term as interchangeable with welfare chauvinism (Eger, Larsen, and Mewes 2020; Cook 2024). Our approach permits exclusionary and potentially inclusive applications of welfare nationalism.

We examine two cases of divided nations where such dynamics are liable to be present. Moving beyond the empirical limitations of existing work on coethnic exclusionary attitudes, we compare the case of South Korea with that of unified Germany, which we discuss further in the next subsection.

2.2   Unified Germany and Divided Korea

This study examines the phenomenon of welfare nationalism through two cases: South Korea and Germany. Specifically, it examines the attitudes of Western Germans toward their Eastern compatriots and South Korean attitudes toward their fellow citizens originally from North Korea. Both cases depart from the conventional focus in the welfare chauvinist and ethnocentrist literature on migrants and other ethnic out-groups. They represent ideal cases for understanding welfare nationalism, providing insights into how national identity, social integration, and historical context influence welfare policy preferences.

The unification of the two Germans allows us to test whether division fostered welfare nationalist impulses among the citizens of the former West German republic similar to those already evidenced in East Asia toward coethnic migrants. Theoretically, Eastern Germans are a curious and important group because they are neither migrants nor a long-established ethnic minority. They are, legally speaking, citizens from a region that was temporarily not part of the nation. Meaning they fall fully beyond the scope of both welfare chauvinism and ethnocentrism conceptually. Thus, if they are subject to exclusionary attitudes, this points to potentially far broader exclusionary dynamics in attitudes toward welfare provision outside of East Asia. It also demonstrates the existence of a potentially important effect of national division, even when division is relatively short in historical terms.

The reunification process in Germany made stark the economic and social differences between the former East and West, which have not subsided entirely despite legal and political unification.[1] These disparities have fostered or reinforced distinct intra-national differences and likely influenced welfare entitlement perceptions. This internal division within Germany is anticipated to exemplify more clearly how exclusionary welfare attitudes can emerge, not

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[1]The reunification of East and West Germany following the fall of the Berlin Wall involved substantial economic, political, and social challenges. Integration proved complicated due to considerable disparities in political systems, economic structures, and social values between the two societies (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007; Campa and Serafinelli 2019; Lippmann, Georgieff, and Senik 2020; c.f., Svallfors 2010). Although substantial progress has been made in economic and social integration (Gramlich 2019b; 2019a), differences in social behavior (Brosig-Koch et al. 2011), levels of social trust (Heineck and Süssmuth 2013), and lack of satisfaction with democracy persist between the East and West (Pickel and Pickel 2023).

from ethnic or migratory distinctions but from historical and regional disparities *within* a nation.

Notably, there is limited literature on measuring the discriminatory attitudes of Western Germans towards those in states constituting the former German Democratic Republic (GDR; East Germany). The current literature on discrimination acknowledges it primarily as a perceived issue among Eastern Germans, with scholars such as Marvin (1995) and Zehring and Domahidi (2022) standing out as exceptions. However, the investigation into discrimination within this demographic is predominantly restricted to qualitative analyses of discourse and political movements. There is a notable lack of quantitative research focused on public attitudes.

The knowledge gap is surprising, especially given the range of literature on German attitudes toward migration (e.g., Schnaudt and Weinhardt 2017), and the growing comparative literature on intra-ethnic hierarchical citizenship and 'origins-based discrimination' more generally (Denney and Green 2021; Koopmans, Veit, and Yemane 2019; Scherr 2015; Seol and Skrentny 2009; Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner 2008). There is substantial evidence compiled using a range of different methods that indicates the existence and persistence of discriminatory and exclusionary attitudes towards migrants in Europe and within former socialist countries. Aside from Eastern Germany, in other post-socialist states in Europe, exclusionary attitudes prevail toward migrants (Bandelj and Gibson 2020; Grdešić 2020; Löw, Puzić, and Matić Bojić 2022), especially with respect toward ethnic and religious minorities. Further, labor market discrimination has also been documented, with ethnic and religious outsiders facing adverse outcomes (Gaddis 2015). While the comparative literature offers frameworks applicable to the German case, their insights have been largely underexplored.

Like the two Germanies, the two Koreas were formed in the late 1940s, but unlike them, the two remain divided. North Koreans are coethnic migrants to South Korea. They are recognized as citizens in all but a small number of cases (for instance, where evidence of espionage is present). This legal status is rooted in the South Korean constitution's claim

over the entire Korean Peninsula. It entitles North Koreans to the same social services and welfare benefits as South Korean citizens, a policy designed to facilitate their integration (they also receive additional resettlement support upon arrival in South Korea).

The near-unconditional right to South Korean citizenship for North Koreans underscores the South Korean government's official stance that it represents the entire peninsula. As we note above, literature has already shown that South Korean citizens of North Korean origin are subject to exclusionary attitudes and encounter what scholars have termed a form of 'conditional inclusion' based on linguistic and cultural differences and, perhaps most significantly, affiliation with the North Korean state (Hough and Bell 2020; Hough 2022; Denney and Green 2024).[2] The discrimination against North Koreans extends to welfare, where their entitlement to benefits is contested (Ward and Denney 2022). In short, the constitutional and legal acknowledgment of a single Korean nation contradicts the social realities faced by North Koreans in the South.

Combining the two cases allows us to investigate whether welfare nationalist tendencies exist even where out-group coethnics are not migrants and whether the persistence of formal, territorial national divisions matters. Figure 1 shows maps of the Korean Peninsula and Germany. These visual aids serve to clarify the geographical and political landscapes of our study populations, with demarcations in color for North Korea and former East Germany.

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[2]Research, mainly based on qualitative methods, also shows that North Korean migrants experience significant daily discrimination due to their North Korean background (e.g., Kim and Jang 2007; Bidet 2009).

Figure 1: Maps of the Korean Peninsula and Germany

Note: Highlighted jurisdictions show current North Korea (L) and the former German Democratic Republic (R), including East Berlin. Data comes from the Database of Global Administrative Areas (GADM) with custom mapping for Berlin.

3 Data and Methodology

Measuring social discrimination can be achieved through experimental methods such as audit studies and correspondence experiments. These approaches involve creating controlled scenarios where individuals with different characteristics, such as criminal records or ethnic backgrounds, apply for the same job positions. The impact of these characteristics on employment opportunities can then be measured and analyzed (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Guul, Villadsen, and Wulff 2019; Pager 2003; Quillian et al. 2017). These experiments provide valuable insights into the extent of discrimination in social attitudes and can help identify areas where improvements, attention, and additional understanding are needed.

We take inspiration from the existing studies in our own design. The social discrimination experiment examines preferences for providing employment support in Germany and South

Korea. We are not strictly interested in discrimination in the labor market but rather using a hypothetical scenario that leverages considerations about a hypothetical employment and job training program the state provides to measure what people think about national others. This experiment investigates social discrimination against co-ethnic citizens in the context of providing job training support. Respondents are tasked with evaluating profiles of two hypothetical candidates based on several attributes like age, family status, sex, occupation, criminal record, and origin at birth. After evaluating the profiles, respondents decide which candidate to prioritize for job support.

In this choice-based conjoint design (Bansak et al. 2021; Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), respondents are exposed to combinations of attributes across different profiles, enabling us to understand these attributes' individual and combined effects. The primary attribute of interest is the individual's origin – whether they are from a jurisdiction of the former GDR and current eastern Germany/North Korea. Respondents are asked to imagine a new government jobs training program providing monetary and counselor support for human capital development. They are then tasked with prioritizing candidates for support by choosing among pairs of typical working-class people (i.e., those most likely to benefit from an employment-supporting intervention).

The attributes are designed to be comparable between the Korean and German contexts, but the individual's origin matches the national context and geography. By assessing German respondents' reactions to these profiles, the design aims to identify any differential treatment or opinions arising from Eastern German origins, thus potentially revealing prejudice against individuals of Eastern descent. The same design logic holds for South Korea, where the focus is on individuals from North Korea. Table 1 outlines the attributes and values of the design.

Using (semi-)nationally representative samples from the online Qualtrics panel population in Germany and South Korea, we administered surveys between September and November 2023. 2,400 Germans completed six (6) tasks, and 2,000 South Korean respondents assessed a total of seven (7) tasks. After careful quality checks, the final sample sizes of 1,882 were

used for Germany and 1,768 for South Korea. Appendix A of the Supplementary Information provides a more detailed overview of the samples.

The conjoint experimental design is particularly suited to assessing discriminatory attitudes based on origin. Significantly, the conjoint design mitigates the potential effects of social desirability by presenting respondents with profiles that mirror residents in their respective countries without explicitly emphasizing any single origin (Horiuchi, Markovich, and Yamamoto 2022). Respondents may express their genuine perceptions without the psychological pressure of conforming to societal norms when presented with such profiles. For instance, a respondent who harbors biases might exhibit discriminatory judgments and feel more comfortable doing so, given the sensitive quantity of interest – origins – is embedded within the multifaceted profile. Furthermore, by maintaining consistent attributes across both German and South Korean contexts – except for the origin variable – the design ensures that any response differences are most likely attributed to origin-based biases. This consistency enables a robust assessment of the discriminatory attitudes prevalent in both countries.

Attribute	Levels	Values	Motivation
Age	4	25, 35, 46, 62	Control attribute but offers insights into age-based preferences or prejudices.
Family status	4	Single, no children; Married, 1 child; Married, 2 children; Single, 1 child	Control attribute but examines biases connected to being single or married and the number of dependents.
Sex	2	Male; Female	Control attribute but can show sex or gender-based biases.
Occupation	4	Part-time convenience store (KR) / supermarket (DE) employee; Department store employee; Security guard; Store manager	Control attribute, but by including diverse job roles, from entry-level to managerial positions, this attribute assesses biases tied to employment status and occupation type.
Criminal record	3	No record; Petty theft; Tax evasion	Shows the impact of past criminal records on contemporary perceptions. It is considered a potential moderating attribute.
Origin at birth	4	Saxony, DE*; Hamburg, DE; Bavaria, DE; Bucharest, RO [Germany]; North Hamgyong, DPRK*; Busan, ROK; Gyeonggi Province, ROK; Hanoi, Vietnam [South Korea]	This attribute includes the main quantities of interest (*) and is the focus of the experiment. By using diverse geographical origins from both Germany and South Korea, along with a non-native origin, this attribute will explore the extent of origins-based discrimination, especially against those from North Korea or a jurisdiction in the former GDR.

Table 1: Attributes and levels for jobs training conjoint

The order of the attributes and the values assigned are randomly assigned. However, we place randomization constraints for the attribute 'Criminal record' to better reflect reality. 70 percent of all profiles contained the 'No record' value, with 15 percent each rounding out some kind of record, either 'Petty theft' or 'Tax evasion.' Notably, we examine whether criminal records have a moderating effect on preferences (i.e., whether some people are more 'punished' over others or if the past record enables more discriminatory attitudes). Research finds that out-groups are considerably more punished for criminal behavior (Ousey and Unnever 2012). Figure 1 shows an example of the experimental design.

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Our study uses marginal means and Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs), where appropriate, to analyze the data derived from forced-choice responses in the choice-based conjoint design. Marginal means compute the average impact of each attribute level on the dependent variable, which in this case involves selecting a preferred candidate for job support. By averaging across other attribute levels, we isolate the effect of individual attribute levels, focusing on those of particular interest. Given our theoretical interest, we focus on Western German responses in the German sample and only those who identify as ethnically German.[3] In the South Korean sample, we look at all responses.

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[3]The jurisdictions constituting Western Germany are: Baden-Württemberg, Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse, Bavaria, Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony. We include only those who resided in a Western German jurisdiction at the age of 18. This simple measurement strategy is meant to capture those socialized under the institutions of the West. We include those who lived in West Berlin before unification, but otherwise exclude Berlin residents.

The AMCEs extend this analysis by measuring the average effect of each attribute on the probability of a candidate being chosen, relative to a baseline attribute level. This method involves holding the levels of all other attributes constant, thus allowing us to assess the independent contribution of each attribute to the selection decision. AMCEs provide a clear interpretation of how different attributes compare to a fixed reference point, making them particularly valuable in understanding the relative influence of specific factors in decision-making processes within the conjoint framework. It also provides a straightforward way to the hypothesis test. We specify the co-national origin of interest (North Hamgyung, Saxony) as the reference level, then examine whether the difference in effect of the other origin levels are statistically significant.

Marginal means and AMCEs offer complementary insights into how attribute levels influence the choice outcomes. Marginal means provide an overall average effect of each attribute across all other levels, giving a broad picture of an attribute's impact. In contrast, AMCEs focus on the effect of each attribute relative to a specific reference category, offering a more precise measurement of how changes in attribute levels affect the choice relative to this baseline. This dual approach ensures a fuller understanding of the findings.

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Studies have demonstrated that for a country to achieve and sustain well-being, its citizens must be engaged in suitable and meaningful jobs. Imagine the [South Korean/German] government will introduce a new jobs training support program. Recipients chosen for support will receive monetary aid for skills acquisition and be assigned a special employment counselor. You have been chosen as a judge for the program. After evaluating the two candidates below, please select who should be prioritized for job support.		
	Candidate A	**Candidate B**
Age	36	45
Family status	Single, no children	Married, 2 children
Sex	Male	Female
Current or recent occupation	Security guard	Store manager
Criminal record	No record	Petty theft
Origin at birth	Saxony, DE	Hamburg, DE
Which candidate would you prioritize?	◯	◯

Figure 2: The experimental design

4 Findings

We begin with Figure 3, which shows the marginal means and AMCEs for previous record and the origin of the hypothetical candidates for Western Germans and South Koreans. We report all attribute values for the marginal means in the Supplementary Information. The means are expressed in percentage form, constituting the probability that a candidate's profile containing the attribute is preferred. We see that both populations heavily penalize candidates who are said to have a previous criminal record. There is less than a 35 percent chance that such profiles are selected. Or, any record results in a 25-30 percentage point

(pp) difference in the probability of candidate being chosen. Those without previous records are strongly preferred, all things considered.

For candidates' origin, we find that both Western Germans and South Koreans discriminate against their national others – those from Saxony or North Hamgyung. This is evidence of welfare nationalism. In the German case, those hailing from jurisdictions associated with the former GDR are considerably more preferred than an immigrant from Romania (10pp difference, as per the AMCEs). However, they are about 3pp less likely to be preferred than those from northern Germany (Hamburg) or southern Germany (Bavaria).

In South Korea, co-national discrimination is even more pronounced. Like Germany, South Koreans are significantly less inclined to prefer an immigrant resident for welfare benefits; this is welfare chauvinism. But those from North Korea are only slightly more preferred. With a marginal mean below 50 percent, a candidate is less likely to be chosen for redistributive assistance simply for having a North Korean origin. More notably, there is a 14pp difference between residents of North Korean origin compared to those from Busan and a 13pp difference relative to those from Gyeonggi Province.

Figure 3: Marginal means and AMCEs of candidate attribute levels, with a focus on Record and Origin

Note: The analysis is based on the benchmark Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with clustered standard errors. Marginal means represent the expected value of the outcome variable for each attribute level, holding all other attributes at their average levels. The AMCEs estimate the average change in the outcome variable associated with a particular attribute level, relative to a reference level, averaged across the distribution of all other attributes. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

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Next, we examine the interaction between having a previous record and origin attributes (Figure 4). We have reason to believe that revealing wrongdoing might motivate even greater discrimination against national others. However, our findings suggest otherwise. We find that everyone is heavily penalized for having a prior record. Regardless of origin, no one who is said to have committed a crime is likely to be chosen. Having a criminal record is a social equalizer for Western Germans in particular. Candidates with immigrant backgrounds are still relatively less preferred than others, but there is no intranational discrimination among these groups. Even in South Korea, where candidates native to South Korea remain preferred, the difference between national other and immigrant origins shrinks from as much as 20pp to less than 15pp. Thus, a criminal penalty is given greater for those otherwise preferred (native-born residents).


Figure 4: Marginal means for the attribute levels of the interaction (Record * Origin)

Note: The analysis is based on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with clustered standard errors. Marginal means represent the expected value of the outcome variable for each attribute level, holding all other attributes at their average levels. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

However, we find that among those without previous records (70 percent of all profiles), the welfare nationalism observed in the main findings persists. In South Korea, the difference between residents of North Korean origins and native-South Koreans for 'no record' profiles actually increases to 16pp. For Western Germans, the difference between East/West remains the same (4pp).

To help bring into focus this finding, we reproduce the candidate preferences by origin for the 'no record' profiles only in Figure 5 and plot the AMCEs, too. Since such profiles are the most likely and realistic (i.e., most people have not committed a crime), we wish to underscore these findings in particular. We can see clearly the moderate welfare nationalism among Western Germans regarding co-nationals from the East (4.5-5pp difference relative to candidates native to the West) and the more extreme welfare nationalism in South Korea regarding those of North Korean origin (15-16pp differences relative to native South Koreans).

**Figure 5:** Marginal means and AMCEs for the attribute levels of Origin ('No record' profiles only)

Note: The analysis is based on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with clustered standard errors. Marginal means represent the expected value of the outcome variable for each attribute level, holding all other attributes at their average levels. The AMCEs estimate the average change in the outcome variable associated with a particular attribute level, relative to a reference level, averaged across the distribution of all other attributes. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

5 Subgroup Analysis and Robustness Checks

Having established our primary findings, we proceed to conduct subgroup analyses that are both intuitively and theoretically motivated to confirm the relevance and importance of these results. First, we assess the role of ethnocentrism in discriminatory attitudes, particularly focusing on whether co-ethnics who are also co-nationals face exclusionary welfare attitudes among those with ethnocentric views. For this purpose, ethnocentrism is measured by respondents' views on the importance of common ancestry and being born in the country as important to being 'true' nationals. From a national identity battery, we count those who think both are 'very' or 'somewhat' important on a 4-point Likert scale as ethnocentric respondents.

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This approach clarifies an understanding of ethnocentric discrimination in welfare policies by discerning whether negative attitudes toward co-ethnics arise from ethnocentric views rather than from broader national identity factors. By focusing on respondents who prioritize shared ancestry ('blood') and nativity, we can more rigorously test our claim that co-ethnic nationals—those from Saxony in the former GDR and North Hamgyung in North Korea—are subject to national othering. This analysis is crucial as it addresses the unique contexts of divided nations where significant socio-political divisions persist despite legal or nominal unifications. In these cases, individuals from these regions are technically part of a unified national identity, yet they often face exclusion as if they were from a separate nation. The findings are reported in Figure 6.

The findings show that ethnocentrism has a particularly strong moderating effect on Western Germans' views of immigrants (from Romania). Those holding non-ethnocentric views do not disfavor immigrant profiles, while South Koreans holding similar views discriminate less, as expected, but still hold fairly strong welfare chauvinistic views. Most notably, however, neither ethnocentric South Koreans nor Western Germans are more likely to favor co-ethnic nationals overall or relative to native West Germans or South Koreans.

Figure 6: Marginal means of Origin attribute levels by subgroup, based on ethnocentrism ('No record' profiles only)

Note: The analysis is based on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with clustered standard errors. Marginal means represent the expected value of the outcome variable for each attribute level, holding all other attributes at their average levels. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Next, we put the idea that co-national discrimination is due to national exclusion and welfare nationalism to another robustness check, a more stringent test, by looking at subgroups defined by the strength of national identification. By differentiating between individuals with relatively strong versus weak national identities, we aim to examine the motivations behind exclusionary welfare policy preferences more closely. This distinction allows us to determine whether these attitudes are specifically driven by nationalistic sentiments, thus affirming the unique role of national identity in shaping welfare attitudes.

Furthermore, examining the attitudes of those with particularly strong national identities might show the extremities of welfare nationalism. If the strongest expressions of national identity are associated with the most exclusionary welfare attitudes, it would significantly bolster the argument that heightened nationalistic sentiments increase support for

discriminatory welfare policies. This finding would underscore the impact of intense national allegiance on social policy orientations within a nation.

To test this expectation, we utilize a 10-point scale to measure the strength of national identity. Respondents scoring at or above the median value—established at 8 for both populations in our samples—are counted as having a strong national identity, while those scoring below this threshold are deemed not to have a strong national identity. Figure 7 shows the outcome.

For the German cohort, the level of welfare chauvinism and welfare nationalism varies with the strength of national identity. Among those with a weaker sense of national identity, Romanian candidates are not disadvantaged, and while Saxony-born residents do not see a change in favorability, the lessened preference for Western German natives diminishes their comparative disadvantage. These findings corroborate the hypothesis that national identity intensifies in-group preferences on the basis of national identity, which, in turn, shapes welfare attitudes.

In stark contrast, the South Korean outcome shows little change; the strength of national identity seems to exert minimal influence on the welfare preferences of individuals, regardless of whether they are comparing immigrants or individuals from North Hamgyong. This could imply that South Korean attitudes towards welfare are more homogenous or possibly that other cultural or socio-political factors play a more dominant role in shaping these attitudes.

Figure 7: Marginal means of Origin attribute levels by subgroup, based on strength of national identity ('No record' profiles only)

Note: The analysis is based on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model with clustered standard errors. Marginal means represent the expected value of the outcome variable for each attribute level, holding all other attributes at their average levels. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

6   Conclusion and Discussion

Welfare chauvinism and ethnocentrism are identified at the intersection of social policy and socio-political attitudes, where people believe that welfare benefits should be limited to native-born or ethnic majority residents (Careja and Harris 2022; Ford 2016). However, these concepts do not fully capture the complexities of exclusion that occur within ethnic or national groups. In situations where ethnic differences are not the primary division, such as between Western and Eastern Germans or South and North Koreans, the focus shifts to a form of chauvinism based on national or regional distinctions rather than on ethnic or racial lines (Denney and Green 2021; Koopmans, Veit, and Yemane 2019; Scherr 2015;

Seol and Skrentny 2009; Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner 2008; Zehring and Domahidi 2022).
Recognizing these dynamics necessitates refining the term welfare chauvinism to include a
wider range of in-group versus out-group dynamics. Therefore, we propose using the term
"welfare nationalism" as a more accurate descriptor for this expanded understanding of
exclusionary practices in welfare policies.

Welfare nationalism, contra welfare chauvinism or ethnocentrism, focuses on how citizens'
attitudes are delineated along national or regional lines within a country on the basis of
national identity. The research demonstrates that preferences exist among Western Germans
and South Koreans against extending state support to groups perceived as "other" within
their own nations – specifically, Eastern Germans and North Koreans. These preferences
are not influenced by ethnic differences but, we argue and support, are strongly shaped
by perceptions of different national identities and historical legacies. These distinctions
lead to a form of exclusionism that advocates for the prioritization of welfare benefits for
those deemed part of the "true" or "original" nation-state, thereby excluding those from
the perceived "other" regions within the same national borders. Overall, the study shows
how these perceived divisions influence social policy support, emphasizing the role of national
identity and historical context in fostering discriminatory attitudes towards welfare provision.

Additional analysis is provided in Appendix C of the Supplementary Information docu-
ment. We underscore here two especially notable findings. First, considering the concept of
support fatigue, posited as an alternative explanation for the resistance to welfare provision
for individuals from historically supported groups such as former East Germans and North
Koreans, is insufficient to account for the observed discriminatory attitudes. Analysis shows
that opposition to extending support to these groups cannot merely be attributed to percep-
tions of over-sufficiency in prior aid. Data indicate that individuals who advocate for broad
welfare support yet oppose specific assistance for these populations are not significantly in-
fluenced by a sentiment of assistance fatigue. Instead, the persistence of discriminatory
attitudes aligns more closely with welfare nationalism. Despite a general endorsement of

welfare support, the selective opposition to welfare benefits for these particular groups suggests that underlying biases rooted in historical and national identity distinctions are more influential.

Second, supplementary analysis shows that demographic factors, particularly age, significantly shape attitudes toward welfare nationalism. Notably, a younger cohort of Germans who have grown up in a reunified nation exhibit less pronounced welfare nationalist attitudes than their older counterparts. This potential generational shift indicates a decline in discriminatory attitudes towards Eastern Germans and suggests a gradual but significant transformation in public sentiment. This finding underscores the importance of demographic dynamics in understanding the persistence and evolution of welfare attitudes within divided nations.

Furthermore, welfare nationalism, as identified within contexts of national or regional division in Germany and Korea, serves as a microcosm of broader dynamics that affect divided national and ethnic groups globally. While originating in specific intra-national divisions, this phenomenon represents the broader challenges divided societies face in reconciling national identity with social equity and inclusion.

At the heart of this linkage is the concept of social identity and belonging. In divided societies, whether the division is based on ethnicity, nationality, or regional identity, there is a common thread: the construction of social identities in opposition to an 'other.' This opposition often becomes institutionalized through policies and practices, including those governing the distribution of welfare benefits. Welfare nationalism or regionalism, therefore, is not an isolated phenomenon but rather a manifestation of broader social and psychological processes that govern human societies.

The implications of this linkage are manifold. First, it highlights how political divisions (borders) within a nation can give rise to divisions between co-ethnics that endure even if the borders have disappeared. The case of Western Germans and the relatively exclusionary attitudes they demonstrate toward prospective Eastern German welfare recipients is clear

evidence of this. The South Korean case shows how much further such attitudes may go when national division is still in effect.

The consensus-like attitudes within the South Korean context warrant attention. In contrast to the German case, where attitudes vary considerably across subgroup variables like political generations and national identity strength, South Korean perspectives on welfare distribution toward North Korean residents are notably 'sticky.' This observation suggests that significant shifts in South Korean public opinion may remain elusive without a formal unification event akin to what occurred in Germany. It is not unreasonable to think that Western German attitudes may have been closer to those of South Koreans prior to unification; in fact, the generational analysis noted in the SI suggests this was likely the case. This finding emphasizes formal political events and processes' critical role in shaping collective attitudes and potentially in mobilizing change towards more inclusive attitudes.

Indeed, the concept of welfare nationalism underscores the importance of narrative and perception in constructing social divides that can exist within national ethnic groups. Just as narratives of ethnic or national superiority can fuel ethnocentrism or nationalism, they can also fuel divisions or fissures within the ethnic group itself. The challenge, therefore, lies in crafting and promoting narratives that encompass all members of a society, regardless of their regional, national, or ethnic origin.

Finally, understanding the dynamics of welfare nationalism or regionalism in the context of divided societies offers insights into the global challenge of managing diversity and ensuring social cohesion. The global increase in migration, displacement, and the blurring of national borders has made the management of diversity and the promotion of social cohesion more critical than ever. In this context, the lessons learned from addressing regional and national divides within countries can inform broader efforts to manage diversity and promote inclusion on a global scale.

Going forward, further research appears to be warranted into how regionalist/national separatist movements like those seen in Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia, among others,

are motivated by or give rise to welfare nationalist tendencies among their members or the larger out-group whose rule they oppose. Is welfare nationalism like that seen among South Koreans and especially older western Germans to their co-ethnic outgroup also to be found among non-Scottish Brits who may oppose providing welfare to hypothetical Scottish claimants, for instance? If they exist, such exclusionary tendencies may point to broader micro-foundations of growing regional divisions in some polities.

In conclusion, this article shows that welfare nationalism, while rooted in specific national or regional contexts, reflects broader dynamics affecting divided national and ethnic groups worldwide. The challenge of reconciling social identity with social equity is a global one, necessitating policies, and narratives that promote inclusion and cohesion. By examining and addressing the mechanisms through which social divides are constructed and perpetuated, societies can move towards greater unity and equity, transcending the divides that separate them.

7 Acknowledgements

8 Funding

9 References

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Supplementary Information for "The Enduring Legacy of Forced Division: Welfare Nationalism in Germany and South Korea"

Appendix A   Additional survey information

Between September and November 2024, responses from the German and South Korean populations were recorded. The recruitment process used Qualtrics' online panel. To ensure (semi-)national representativeness, quotas were established in alignment with recent demographic parameters. Multiple quality assurance steps were included, incorporating Qualtrics' inbuilt quality control systems and specific questions designed to detect inattentiveness and validate manipulation and survey completion. Responses that failed the quality check criteria were replaced. An additional evaluation of the data quality using manipulation and attention checks was conducted after the collection period. The final validated sample sizes are 1,882 of the initial 2,400 for Germany and 1,768 of 2,000 for South Korea. We note that we deliberately oversampled in German federal states comprising East/Eastern Germany (former states of the German Democratic Republic), which are otherwise under-sampled. The data quality for these additional respondents had to be manually checked for quality, many of which were removed. Analysis of responses from these jurisdictions is thus done carefully.

Tables A.1-A.4 review the basic demographics of each sample and additional questions used for analysis in the manuscript or discussed in the manuscript but with additional analysis in Appendix C.

Variable	Count	Proportion
Age		
≤25	200	11%
26-35	295	16%
36-45	327	17%
46-55	323	17%
>55	737	39%
Sex		
Male	913	49%
Female	969	51%
Highest level of education		
No University	1263	67%
University (including technical college)	619	33%
Ethnicity		
Other	161	9%
German	1680	89%
Turkish	41	2%
Location		
Capital		
Berlin	133	7%
North		
Schleswig-Holstein	49	3%
Hamburg	57	3%
Lower Saxony	161	9%
Bremen	5	< 1%
North Rhine-Westphalia	419	22%
South		
Rhineland-Palatinate	105	6%
Baden-Württemberg	186	10%
Bavaria	233	12%
Hesse	124	7%
Saarland	34	2%
East		
Brandenburg	70	4%
Saxony	129	7%
Saxony-Anhalt	70	4%
Thuringia	65	3%
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania	42	2%

Table A.1: German Sample: Summary Counts and Proportions
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number

Variable	Count	Proportion
Regional identity		
Western German	1362	72%
Eastern German	424	23%
Berlin after unification	96	5%
Attitude towards support for residents in former GDR		
Supports assistance	871	46%
Opposes assistance	766	41%
Neither	245	41%
Ethnocentric		
No	1372	73%
Yes	510	27%
National identity strength		
Strong	1205	64%
Weak	677	36%
West German political generations		
Neither	648	34%
Pre-unification	619	33%
Post-unification	615	33%

Table A.2: German Sample: Summary Counts and Proportions for Selected Variables
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number

Variable	Count	Proportion
Age		
≤25	333	19%
26-35	453	26%
36-45	475	27%
46-55	333	19%
>55	169	10%
Gender		
Male	959	54%
Female	804	46%
Highest level of education		
No University	306	17%
University (including technical college)	1457	83%
Location		
Capital Area		
Seoul	591	34%
Gyeonggi Province	361	21%
Incheon	135	8%
Gangwon Province	36	2%
Yeongnam		
Busan	133	8%
Daegu	86	5%
Ulsan	36	2%
North Gyeongsang Province	48	3%
South Gyeongsang Province	69	4%
Chungcheong-Honam		
Gwangju	55	3%
Daejeon	56	3%
Sejong	15	1%
North Chungcheong Province	40	2%
South Chungcheong Province	33	2%
North Jeolla Province	30	2%
South Jeolla Province	23	1%
Other		
Jeju	16	1%

Table A.3: South Korean Sample: Summary Counts and Proportions
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number

Variable	Count	Proportion
Attitude towards support for North Korean migrant assistance		
Supports assistance	1356	77%
Opposes assistance	305	17%
Neither	102	6%
Ethnocentric views		
Yes	918	52%
No	845	48%
National identity strength		
Strong	1193	68%
Weak	570	32%

Table A.4: South Korean Sample: Summary Counts and Proportions for Selected Variables
Note: Percentages rounded to nearest whole number

Appendix B   Survey questions

The survey questions used for background and subgroup analysis are provided below.

Background questions:

- What was your assigned sex at birth? (*both*)

    - Male
    - Female

- In which federal state do you currently reside? (*Germany*)

    - Baden-Württemberg
    - Bavaria
    - Berlin
    - Brandenburg
    - Bremen
    - Hamburg
    - Hesse
    - Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania
    - Lower Saxony
    - North Rhine-Westphalia
    - Rhineland-Palatinate
    - Saarland
    - Saxony
    - Saxony-Anhalt
    - Schleswig-Holstein
    - Thuringia

- Where do you currently reside? (*South Korea*)

    - Seoul
    - Busan
    - Daegu
    - Incheon
    - Gwangju
    - Daejeon
    - Ulsan

- Sejong
  - Gyeonggi
  - Kangwon
  - Chungbuk
  - Chungnam
  - Cheonbuk
  - Cheonnam
  - Gyeongbuk
  - Gyeongnam
  - Jeju

- Please specify your age. (*both*)

  - (validated input line)

- What is the highest level of education you have achieved? (*Germany*)

  - University (Bachelor's degree)
  - University (Diploma, Master's degree or higher)
  - General qualification for university entrance (Abitur or equivalent)
  - University of Applied Sciences entrance qualification (Fachhochschulreife)
  - Completed elementary education, but no secondary school qualification yet
  - Elementary education not completed
  - Intermediate secondary school qualification (Mittlere Reife/Realschulabschluss or equivalent)
  - Basic secondary school qualification (Volks-/Hauptschulabschluss or equivalent)

- What is the highest level of education you have achieved? (*South Korea*)

  - No Formal Education
  - Elementary school or lower
  - Middle school
  - High school
  - Some college (including technical school)
  - University
  - Graduate school and above
  - Other (e.g., Seodang)

Additional questions used for subgroup analysis:

- In order to be a true [German/South Korean], how important is it to have [South Korean/German] ancestry?

    - Very important
    - Somewhat important
    - Not particularly important
    - Not important at all

- Which party would you vote for if there was a national election tomorrow? (*Germany*)

    - Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)
    - Alliance 90/The Greens
    - Christian Democratic Union (CDU)
    - Christian Social Union (CSU)
    - Free Democratic Party (FDP)
    - Alternative for Germany (AfD)
    - Another party
    - I don't know

- When distinguishing between progressives and conservatives in our society, where do you belong? (*South Korea*)

    - Very progressive
    - Somewhat progressive
    - Centrist
    - Somewhat conservative
    - Very conservative

- Which party would you vote for if there was a national election tomorrow? (*South Korea*)

    - People's Power Party
    - Minjoo Party
    - Justice Party
    - Basic Income Party
    - Progressive Party
    - Transition Korea
    - Hope of Korea
    - I don't know

- In order to be a true [German/South Korean], how important is it to have [South Korean/German] ancestry?

  - Very important
  - Somewhat important
  - Not particularly important
  - Not important at all

- In order to be a true [German/South Korea], how important is it to have been born in [South Korea/Germany]?

  - Very important
  - Somewhat important
  - Not particularly important
  - Not important at all

- On a scale of 0 (not very) to 10 (very), how [German/South Korean] do you feel?

  - (10-point scale)

- The government should provide special vocational support for [North Korean refugees (*South Korea*)/citizens in jurisdictions of the former GDR (*Germany*)].

  - Agree
  - Disagree

Alternative measures of policy preferences (*both*):

- The government should provide special vocational support for needy citizens.

  - Agree
  - Disagree

- The government should provide special vocational support for [North Korean refugees (*South Korea*)/citizens in jurisdictions of the former GDR (*Germany*)].

  - Agree
  - Disagree

Appendix C   Additional Analysis

We provide additional analysis here to supplement the findings presented in the manuscript. First, we show the marginal means for all attribute levels for the German and South Korean samples (Figure C1). Next, we present and examine the marginal means of all attribute levels for the German sample, including the East/Eastern Germans[1]. Figure C2 shows that Eastern Germans prefer candidates from the East over others. This trend indicates a form of regional solidarity or in-group bias consistent with our welfare nationalism explanation, where Eastern Germans exhibit a favorable disposition towards candidates who share their regional identity. It is not our intention to focus on Eastern German preferences, and we are less confident in the quality of this subgroup, but we find the data nevertheless corroborating our main claim.

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[1]As with West/Western Germans (footnote 3 in the manuscript), we define this as people who were in federal states at the age of 18 that were either the German Democratic Republic or formerly so.

Figure C.1: Marginal means of all candidate attribute levels for German and South Korean samples

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure C.2: Marginal means of all candidate attribute levels for the German sample, including respondents from East region

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Second, we explore whether opposition to employment support for individuals from Eastern Germany or North Korea stems from national othering or from assistance fatigue. Given that both groups have historically received significant governmental support, particularly in former East German jurisdictions, we question whether such opposition reflects a sentiment that these groups have already benefited sufficiently from aid.[2]

To examine this question, we take responses from direct questions about support for government support (see Appendix B). The first question asks whether the respondents think the government should provide employment support for citizens in need. The second question asked specifically whether they thought the government should provide employment support to those from former East Germany or those from North Korea. Where respondents answer yes to the former question but no to the latter question, we count them as opposing assistance (i.e., showing assistance fatigue). Those who answer yes to the second question, regardless of their first answer, are counted as supporting assistance. Figure 5 shows the subgroup findings. Here and in subsequent analysis in this section, we sunset the samples by profiles only containing candidates with no previous records, as was the primary focus in the manuscript. Figure C3 shows the marginal means per subgroup.

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[2]This statement alludes to the extensive support both East Germans and North Koreans have received from government programs, particularly focusing on the former East German states after the reunification of Germany. For East Germany, this support was crucial in the post-reunification period, aiming to elevate the economic status of the new Bundesländer (federal states) to that of the Western Bundesländer. This included infrastructural investments, business subsidies, and social welfare enhancements to mitigate the economic disparities caused by 40 years of separate development under different political and economic systems. For North Koreans, the context is different and primarily relates to defectors who have relocated, typically to South Korea, where they receive governmental assistance aimed at integration and rehabilitation. This includes financial aid, housing assistance, education, and job training programs to facilitate their transition into a society markedly different from the one they left. In both cases, the governmental support has been substantial, reflecting a policy commitment to integrating these groups into a broader national framework, addressing socio-economic disparities, and promoting social cohesion. This historical backdrop is essential for understanding current attitudes toward continued support for these groups, as it frames public perception of their needs versus their received benefits.

Figure C.3: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on attitudes towards supporting residents in former GDR jurisdictions or from North Korea

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

While we see a decrease in the relative differences in preferences between the national others and natives among those who support redistribution, differences remain even so. The data suggests that the readiness to extend support to historically separate or distinct groups is moderated by factors beyond mere economic considerations, lending corroborating support to our welfare nationalism thesis.

Third, we consider the moderating effects of regions. Given regionalism tendencies, it is an important consideration. Our regions are based on those identified in the sample overviews in Appendix A. Figures C4 (Germany) and C5 (South Korea) show the subgroup findings.

For Germany, having examined the East already (above), we focus on North/South differences. We find that Germans from the South of the country demonstrate a marked preference for candidates from Bavaria, their own region (and, for some, their home federal state), and

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a significant bias against those from Saxony. This could indicate a stronger regional identity in the South, potentially influenced by economic prosperity and cultural factors that lead to preferential treatment for in-region candidates.

On the other hand, the lesser degree of discrimination against Saxon candidates by Northern Germans may reflect different inter-regional dynamics in this part of Germany. The data suggests a more inclusive attitude in the North towards fellow Germans from the East, perhaps due to historical, socio-economic, and cultural proximities that differ from those in the South. Moreover, the North's lower discrimination levels against Saxon candidates may also stem from a different experience of the unification process or a less pronounced regional identity.

Notably, the analysis shows that both Northern and Southern Germans are equally inclined to exhibit welfare chauvinistic attitudes toward candidates of foreign origin. This indicates that while regional and national identities significantly shape welfare preferences within Germany, these identities do not necessarily translate into inclusive attitudes towards residents of an immigrant origin (German national or not).

For regions of South Korea, we do not see any major differences. What largely emerges is that relatively small differences aside (e.g., capital area residents have a slight preference for former residents of North Korean origin over those from Vietnam), South Koreans, by and large, prefer those native to *South* Korea. Those from North Korea are subject to the same welfare chauvinism that those from unambiguously foreign origins are.

Figure C.4: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on German regions

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.


Figure C.5: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on South Korean regions

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Jeju counted with Chungcheon-Honam.

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Fourth, we focus on the German sample only and consider whether there is any major difference in opinion by age groups, defined by whether one would have come of age under a unified or divided Germany, measuring each as a distinct political generation. It is hard, and often impossible, to disaggregate age from cohort effects using cross-sectional data, but it is at the very least a test of differences in opinion by age at the time of the survey and relevant even in that case. Only considering those who spent a minimum of 12 years under a divided or unified German polity, we count those from Western Germany who were still living there at the age of 18 and who were born between the years 1934 and 1971 as belonging to the pre-unification generation. Those born after 1976 are assigned to the post-unification generation. Figure C6 presents the results.

The data indicates that welfare nationalism appears to be diminishing among the post-unification population in Germany. Such a decline is a positive sign from a normative standpoint, suggesting a generational shift towards more inclusive attitudes. Furthermore, the consistency of this trend across different German states reinforces our assertion that discrimination among co-nationals predominantly hinges on national identity rather than local or regional identities.

Figure C.6: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on Western German political generations

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Lastly, we examine preferences by education levels (defined in the sample overviews) and political identification, measured as partisanship.

German Respondents who identified their party preference as either the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), Alliance 90/The Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), or The Left (DIE LINKE) were categorized as "Left-wing." These parties are typically associated with progressive and socialist platforms in Germany's political landscape. Those who preferred the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) or the Christian Social Union (CSU), which often run as a single entity in federal elections, along with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), were classified under the "Center" category. These parties generally advocate for centrist to center-right policies, blending conservative, social market, and liberal economic stances. Lastly, respondents who indicated their support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) were placed in the "Right-wing" category. The AfD is known for its right-wing populist and

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nationalist positions, often emphasizing anti-immigration rhetoric and Euroscepticism.

For South Korean respondents, we used a combination of party support and political self-identification. Given the country's two-party dominant system (the conservative People's Power Party and liberal-progressive Minjoo (Democratic) Party), more people self-identify as centrists/support neither of the two main parties when, in fact, they lean left or right. This differs from Germany's multi-party system, allowing for better party representation of citizen preferences. We consider political self-identification (conservative or progressive) and party support to account for this. Respondents who claim to support neither party but otherwise identify as politically conservative or progressive are counted as such. We then have a partisan measurement that includes a considerable number of "partisan leaners" (conservative and progressive).

Figures C7-C10 report the findings. There are some differences in preferences by education level, most notably for Western Germans. Those with a tertiary level of education (32 percent of the population) are less likely to exhibit welfare nationalism (natives to Western Germany are less preferred) and have lower levels of welfare chauvinism. In the South Korean sample, those with a university-level of education actually prefer South Korean natives more.

The most notable finding for political identification is that, in the Western German case, right-wing partisans (i.e., AfD supporters) exhibit strong nativist tendencies, as expected. Interestingly, they are also less likely to discriminate against residents from the East, a reflection of their ethnic-welfare state advocacy wherein all native-born Germans are the in-group. For South Koreans, we see that progressives do have relatively more favorable views of residents from North Korea than conservatives, a position consistent with the political views of each side. Progressives typically advocate for engagement and reconciliation with the North, which likely informs their more favorable views toward co-nationals from North Korea. This progressive stance may also be softened by a form of ethnic nationalism that emphasizes the shared heritage and kinship of all Koreans, regardless of the political divide.

Conservatives, conversely, tend to be more skeptical of North Korea, favoring a hardline approach due to security concerns and ideological differences. However, the differences we observe are relatively modest.

Figure C.7: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on Western German education levels

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure C.8: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on South Korean education levels

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure C.9: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on Western German political identification

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure C.10: Marginal means of candidate attribute levels by subgroup, based on South Korean political identification

Note: Based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors, the marginal means show the mean outcome of any given attribute level, averaged across all others. The error bars represent 95 percent confidence intervals.