Political Attitudes and National Identity in an Era of Strength and Prosperity: A Primer on a New Nationalism in South Korea

Steven Denney
Department of Political Science
University of Toronto

Nationalism is central to the understanding of the modern nation-state. Broadly speaking, it describes two distinct phenomena: “the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve (or sustain) self-determination.”¹ Both phenomena in post-developmental South Korea are explored here. Using data and reports from the World Values Survey (WVS), literature on South Korean nationalism and civil society, the latest public opinion data, and conservative and progressive discourses, this paper sketches a primer on a new nationalism taking shape in the Republic of Korea. The overall objective of this preliminary research venture is to see how material and structural changes are causing variation in national identity and policy preferences of South Koreans amongst various units of analysis.

Value Change in a Post-material World: the World and South Korea

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a comprehensive, cross-national research project that explores variation in values and beliefs and considers the political impact changes in these values have on societies. From 1981 to 2006, the WVS conducted five waves of surveys (a sixth will be completed in early 2014), covering nearly 90 percent of the world’s population. Amongst other dimensions, the Traditional/Secular-rational and Survival/Self-expression cross-culture values are reported to account for more than 70 percent of the cross-national variance “in a factor analysis of ten indicators;” further, “each of these dimensions is strongly correlated with scores of other important orientations.”²

Ronald Inglehart (WVS Director) and Christian Welzel (WVS President) define the values as follows:

“The Traditional/Secular-rational values dimension…”

reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not. A wide range of other orientations are closely linked with this dimension. Societies near the traditional pole emphasize the importance of parent-child ties and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values, and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide. These
societies have high levels of national pride, and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposition preferences on all of these topics.\textsuperscript{3}

The second major dimension of cross-cultural values, Survival/Self-expression, is understood as a measurement of the variation in values that occurs during the transition from an industrial to post-industrial society. In industrial societies, where physical security and economic well-being are less certain, there is an overwhelming emphasis on order, security and economic growth, in addition to other related concerns. But with modernization came enormous, sustained material growth. Contrary to prior generations, an increasing number of those who grew up in industrial societies did so taking survival for granted. “Thus,” write Inglehart and Welzel, “priorities have shifted from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life.”\textsuperscript{4}

The second dimension is the more interesting of the two and has the potential to serve as an explanatory dimension for significant values changes between generations within societies. “A central component of this emerging dimension,” posit Inglehart and Welzel, “involves the polarization between Materialist and Postmaterialist values, reflecting a cultural shift that is emerging among generations who have grown up taking survival for granted.”\textsuperscript{5} Inglehart, in book edited by Pippa Norris on “critical citizens,” argues that “in advanced industrial societies, the prevailing direction of development has changed in the last quarter-century… [in a way] so fundamental that it seems appropriate to describe it as ‘postmodernization’, rather than ‘modernization’.” Modernization emerged out of a worldview defined by “materialistic rationality,” a rational-legal outlook, highly scientific, with the state becoming the “omnipotent and benevolent entity... [which precipitated] the apparently inexorable growth of the economic, political, and social role of government.”\textsuperscript{6} Naturally, these “modernists” exhibited strong support for national security, economic growth, and social stability. However, starting in the latter half of the 20th century a major shift occurred. Inglehart explains:

Within the last few decades, a major deflection in the direction of change has occurred that might be called the ‘Postmodern shift’. Its origins are rooted in the economic miracles that occurred first in Western Europe and north America, and later in East Asia and now in Southeast Asia. Coupled with the safety net of the modern welfare state, this has produced unprecedentedly high levels of economic security, giving rise to a cultural feedback that is having a major impact on both the economic and political systems of advanced industrial societies. This new trajectory shifts authority away from both religion and the state to the individual…. Postmodernization deemphasizes all kinds of authority, whether religious or secular, allowing much wider range for individual autonomy in the pursuit of individual subjective well-being.”\textsuperscript{7}

Post-materialists emphasize subjective well-being and self-expression over deference to the state, display higher tolerance of outgroups, more emphasis on imagination, support careers for women,
create new gender roles (especially in the house), are less “techno-optimistic,” and show more support for the “ecology movement.” Moreover, post-materialists are more politically active (at work and in society) and help produce “a culture of trust and tolerance… [placing] a high value on individual freedom and self-expression”—the types of characteristics that many consider crucial to a functioning democracy.\(^8\) Insofar as national identity and policy preference are concerned (ergo, nationalism), investigating the effects that effect that enormous material and structural changes have had on values in South Korea is as good a starting point as any for this study.

**South Korea in the 21st Century**

South Korea is an interesting case for several reasons: it experienced a sort of hyper-modernization, going from rice paddy backwater to export-producing economic powerhouse in the span of only a few generations; reached, as of 2013, a GDP per capita more than five times the average for East Asia and the Pacific;\(^9\) is the only country to transition from ODA recipient to donor; and has made an irreversible transition to democracy. However, despite South Korea’s economic and political developments, social welfare policies are still largely underdeveloped (though welfare spending has increased\(^10\)). Even so, South Korea’s rapid material and structural changes have produced generational gaps that even perspicacious passers-by can detect. The changes seem to have precipitated a change in values consistent with broader global trends. WVS research on values change in South Korea tentatively confirms this shift.

Professor Auh Soo Young, WVS principal investigator for South Korea until 2005, has traced variation in values among South Koreans for three waves of surveys in South Korea. Summarizing arguments made by Inglehart in his work on value changes in 20th century Europe, Auh writes: “Those who grew up in a materialistically abundant and physically secure environment are likely to prefer post-materialist values to materialists values.”\(^11\) Overall, Auh’s research reveals that, despite the persistence of “survival values,” relative to other countries (see **Figure 1**), there has been a significant change, over time, in values within South Korea that are consistent with global trends.
Drawing on inspiration from political socialization theory, Auh contributes this shift to changes in the environment, especially during the character formation stage. “It is argued,” Auh writes, “that the value priorities established during a person’s character-formation years… will, to a great extent, continue to prevail into adulthood.” Thus, given Korea’s late but rapid industrialization, it could be hypothesized that as newer generations enter the character formation state (i.e., pre-adult experiences), the greater the socializing effect of the material conditions will be relative to older generations. If true, we should see a general trend in South Korea, one moving from materialism to post-materialism, but not without certain qualifications. A brief recap of some of the major changes in South Korea over the last several decades should suffice in establishing a material and structural backdrop.

South Korea in the 21st century is typically associated with activities of advanced nations: hosting the G20, exporting high-end computer technologies, and having democratic elections. It is easy to forget the significant difference in material conditions 30 years has made. Compare, for instance, the structural and material differences between those who were raised in the early 1970s (people now in their 40s), early 1980s (those now in their 30s), and early 1990s (those now in their 20s). The first group will have grown up under the Yushin Regime and Park Chung-hee’s Heavy-
Chemical Industry Drive (HCI); Yushin and HCI were deliberate efforts on the part of Park Chung-hee to push state-lead development of Korean conglomerates for the partly economic and largely political-security reason: North Korea was largely on par with South Korean economic development and there was fear that the US would soon reduce its troop presence on the peninsula (the war in Indochina was ongoing and the Korean DMZ Conflict/”Second Korean War” had recently occurred). GDP per capita was a mere $278 in 1970. In short, “survival” in a largely underdeveloped economy represented the structural and material conditions under which people grew up. The 1980s, though not as politically volatile as the prior decade, bore witness to volatile and sometimes combative state-society relations, including the Gwangju Democratic Uprising and a partial democratic transition in 1987. GDP per capita was $1,674 in 1980.

The 1990s was a time of significant structural change, the most notable of which was the complete transition to democracy—first with the election of civilian centrist Kim Young-sam in 1993, followed by the election of long-time democratic dissident Kim Dae-jung in 1997—and a fundamental shift in North-South relations, manifested in Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and his 2000 summit meeting in Pyongyang. GDP per capita was just over $6,100 in 1990 and would nearly double by the decades end despite the detrimental macro- and micro-economic effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.

Auh, connecting material environment to values formation, asserts: “in [a] generation that experienced materialistic abundance and physical security, there will be many who… consider post-materialistic values to be of importance.” Drawing insight from early socialization theory, he argues that “the character-structure or value priority formed during the formation period does not change overnight, but rather lasts for a long time.” Thus, what happens early in the character formation stage disproportionately affects the way a person understands political, economic, and social issues as an adult.

Using data from three waves of WVS (1990, 1996, and 2001), Auh finds that “the noticeable distribution difference of value types in relation to age cohort in South Korea is due to the different environment experienced during the character formation period (generation difference).” Although there is a decrease in post-materialists in the 30s and 40s age cohorts, these cohorts do not become materialists. Most people in South Korea are holders of mixed values.

Auh also discovers that trust in political institutions amongst post-materialists is very low, relative to materialists and mixed types; this finding shows South Korea following global trends. Inglehart, in his work on global trends in values change finds that post-materialists, in addition to
exhibiting strong traits of tolerance and civic participation, also demonstrate higher levels of distrust towards political institutions and are less deferential to authority. He elaborates:

… conditions of prosperity and security are conducive to greater emphasis on individual autonomy and diminishing deference to authority. Until recently, existential insecurity was a usual part of the human condition. Only recently have societies emerged in which most of the population does not have any fear of starvation (which is still a very real concern for much of humanity). Both pre-modern agrarian society and modern industrial society were shaped by survival values. The Postmodern shift has brought a broad de-emphasis on all forms of authority.\textsuperscript{21}

South Koreans, like others who have grown up taking security and material abundance as givens, no longer subjugate the subjective well being to security and the maximization of economic growth; thus, the emphasis turns from state to individual an deference to authority to support for individual well-being. Auh asks, regarding this development: “Is this [phenomenon] unique to the South Korean case?” The answer seems to be a resounding no, as indicated by WVS research in cross-national values variation. The more appropriate question might be: Has South Korea’s material abundance created a rise in the number of post-materialists (sustained across age-cohorts) and, if so, what are the broader implications? Findings by Auh suggest that, indeed, Korea seems to be trending towards a higher number of post-materialists and a greater number of people who demonstrating postmodern attitudes (e.g., lower levels of trust in political institutions).

But there are some limitations to Auh’s findings. First, his research is somewhat outdated; he does not incorporate the latest WVS findings (2008 and 2014). This is, of course, of no fault of his own. Auh’s latest work was published in 2008, and he has since retired from his position as Principle Investigator (PI) for the WVS in South Korea.\textsuperscript{22} Second, little attempt to made to contextualize the data or use alternative methods other than reporting on clusters of data and correlation tests between the data. There is little to no attempt to increase inferential leverage through qualitative process tracing or other non-quantitative methods. In all fairness, corroborating the findings, by way of alternative inferential methods, was likely never Auh’s intention; as PI for WVS in South Korea, his primary task was to report on the WVS data—and nothing more, apparently. Lastly, no mention is made of the clear and present danger posed by North Korea and how that might skew the data; having a constant existential threat is likely to result in a higher number of materialists or mixed types in society. This is one plausible cause, amongst others, for the persistence of survival values in South Korea.

As for incorporating the latest WVS findings, that effort will have to wait for further research. The remainder of this paper will address the latter two of the shortcomings. In doing so it
should be noted that the intention of this paper is not to isolate key explanatory variables for the purpose of establishing strong casual inference. Rather, at this stage of the research, more concern is given to entertaining the plausibility of the overall argument through abductive reasoning. Using the literature on nationalism and civil society in South Korea, the latest in public opinion polls, and close readings of South Korean discourse, the intention is paint a primer on a new nationalism by indicating how the state, the elites, and the people think in a new, materially prosperous era.

The State in an Era of Strength and Prosperity

Many South Koreans are now coming to terms with the fact that they are indeed citizens of a “strong and prosperous country.” It is a slogan more commonly depicted in bold type on North Korean propaganda banners or proclaimed in speeches by Kim Jong-il as kangseong taeguk (강성대국), yet South Korea is also a lover of a development slogan with a nationalistic hue: buguk gangbyeong (“rich country, powerful army;” 부국강병) reads the South Korean variant. The translation may be different, but the point is the same: building a militarily strong and economically prosperous country for the purpose of protecting—and if possible extending—national sovereignty. A modernized military, with a strong backbone in the US security guarantee, protects Korea from conventional military threats whilst a strong export sector, driven by large conglomerates, ensures economic growth and viability. Whereas North Korea is still a relatively isolated, reactive, and highly nationalistic country mostly disconnected from the global economy, South Korea is a state built on an ideology of globalization and relative economic openness.

Locating a state ideology for the democratic southern half of the peninsula, where power is relatively diffuse and the press is at least nominally free, is a slightly more tedious task than it is for North Korea. Yet, it exists—even if it requires some “reading between the lines.” Take, for instance, Park Geun-hye’s pre-presidential run Foreign Affairs essay wherein she outlines her policy of Trustpolitik. In the second paragraph, she writes:

Only two weeks [before the shelling of Yeonpyeong], South Korea had become the first country outside the G-8 to chair and host a G-20 summit, welcoming world leaders to its capital, Seoul. These events starkly illustrated the dual reality of the Korean Peninsula and of East Asia more broadly. On the one hand, the Korean Peninsula remains volatile. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, the modernization of conventional forces across the region, and nascent great-power rivalries highlight the endemic security dilemmas that plague this part of Asia. On the other hand, South Korea's extraordinary development, sometimes called the Miracle on the Han River, has, alongside China's rise, become a major driver of the global economy over the past decade.
Among other things, this quote highlights key characteristics of the ideologies that drive North and South Korea government and policymaking. Though Park speaks disapprovingly of North Korea’s “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” the possession of said weapons of mass destruction (ergo, nuclear weapons) is a key ideological pillar of the Kim regime.24 As for South Korea, Park’s reference to the G-20 Summit and Korea’s “extraordinary development” as a “major driver of the global economy” reflects the global consciousness found in both Seoul’s ruling elite and the public at-large. Thus, if the “Byungjin line”25 best captures the governing ideology in North Korea, globalization does the same for South Korea’s body of elected politicians and administrative bureaucrats.

Of the former developmental states in East Asia, there is no country whose elites are more supportive of globalization than those in positions of power in South Korea. Globalization is a controversial word/policy in a Japan who has yet to come to grips with its economically and politically diminished self, Taiwan is too peripheral, and Hong Kong and Singapore are not conventional “states.” Korea, however, is centrally located (think “lynchpin”), has plenty of economic and political capital, and is as devoted to a global agenda as anyone. Seoul’s willingness to bear the financial burden of hosting events of global scope (Summer Olympics, FIFA World Cup, ROK-China-Japan Trilateral Summit, G-20 Summit, Nuclear Security Summit, and soon the Winter Olympics) is just the visible outer layer to an increasingly outward-oriented ruling elite.

With roots dating back to at least President Kim Young-sam’s “globalization” policies (locally referred to as “saegyehwa;” 세계화), Seoul has, since the end of the Cold War, redefined its regional identity as an “honest broker” or “bridge” and firmly integrated itself into a complex global trading system. In addition to introducing the “New Asia Initiative” (NAI), a regional policy aimed at more substantive engagement with countries of the Asia-Pacific, especially the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Korea has concluded FTAs with both the European Union and the Untied States, making it the only country to have FTAs with the world’s two largest economies.26

Though indicative of Korea’s economic development and influence, these indicators speak of no more than macro-level developments. In what ways do highly “visible,” more easily discernable, macro-level policies reflect more general shifts at the domestic level?

The opinions of conservative elites, the progressive press, and the “gusts of popular feeling” indicate something more than a general commitment to globalization: a nascent but burgeoning “new” nationalism. Koreans have begun to view themselves and their country in a way
that reflects political, social, and economic realities of modern Korea. These realities are based on the country’s modern accomplishments and a formidable development experience that has fostered a new national identity and new political attitudes.

**Nuclear Weapons and Young Realists**

Aside from a general shift in attitudes towards the state, a small but not un-influential cohort within the conservative right has begun to assert what they believe is South Korea’s sovereign right: the possession of nuclear weapons. Though the idea is certainly not in any sense “mainstream” at the moment, Mark Hibbs was right to note in a *Foreign Policy* article, “Will South Korea Go Nuclear?,” that there is now a certain degree of pressure from the conservative right to consider either A) re-introducing US tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea (removed in 1991); or B) starting up an indigenous nuclear weapons program (some would perhaps say “restarting”). Given that the US is adamant that South Korea should remain nuclear-free, option A is clearly off the table, but option B is inching further into the conservative political discourse and onto the pages of conservative newspapers.

The notion of South Korea going nuclear for the second time in its modern history is perceived as a solution to concerns related to the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella and the existential threat posed by North Korea. Most importantly, in an era of strength and prosperity, what better way to help solve the century-old issue of sovereignty than to acquire the world’s most powerful deterrent? Indeed, following the most recent North Korean nuclear test, a stalwart conservative pundit and former editor of *Chosun Monthly*, Cho Gab-je, published an article entitled “Why the Nuclear Arming of South Korea is Possible.” In the article, he provided 10 reasons why South Korea can and should go nuclear, including some to explain why the US either cannot or will not stop it from doing so.

Cho’s perspective is still an outlier, but the general population, including young South Koreans, supports a shift towards more assertive, traditionally conservative policies. In fact, during times of increased perceptions of vulnerability (e.g., after North Korea nuclear weapons test) broad-based support increase significantly. According to an Asan Institute report on public opinion immediately following the 3rd North Korean nuclear test, “66% of the South Korea public supported a domestic nuclear weapons program,” which was a “10pp increase from 2010.” Most notably, nearly 50 percent of the 20s cohort supported the same move. The trend amongst young South Koreans, especially regarding issues of national security (ergo national prestige), suggests “the young think like the old.” The report states:
One of the most consistent findings of Asan surveys is that Koreans in their 20s identify themselves as “national security conservatives,” and often correlate very closely with those in their 60s and older on issues related to North Korea. The same seems to have applied in this case, as 72% of those 60 or older reported feeling threatened by the most recent test (the highest), while 64% of those in their 20s reported the same (second highest).

In a 2012 interview with the author, Karl Friedhoff, Program Officer at the Asan Institute, had the following to say about the way younger South Koreans feel about modern Korea:

A “strong Korea” means an “independent Korea.” While there is a lot of support for the US-ROK alliance, we are seeing across the board stronger support for a more independent Korea. This is especially true for people in their 20s. For this age group, they know no other strong regional power in the way their parents and grandparents did, other than Korea itself. Growing up in the age of Japan’s lost decade, the concept of a strong Japan is lost on them, and China, though certainly an economic power, is not perceived to be as industrially and technologically advanced as Korea. Their perception of what Korea is and represents is much different from that of previous generations. Events like the 2002 World Cup, wherein the Koreans had a strong showing, are some of the earliest memories for younger Koreans. They have this new perception, which... is reshaping the way Koreans view themselves and, as such, is redefining Korean identity…. For the youngest generation in Korea, it is taken for granted that Korea is a strong and prosperous nation.

As will be considered in more detailed below, the environment under which the younger age cohorts (“the future”) grow up and the experiences they have is of enormous significance regarding value formation and identity.

Nukes and Progressives

In a country as polarized as South Korea, it may seem counterintuitive at first but progressives find a lot of common ground with conservatives. Both sides of the political aisle support a militarily strong and economically prosperous South Korea. There are, however, some significant differences. Using the “nuclear issue,” again, as a wedge issue, the progressive position can be summarized as follows: continue developing nuclear energy, but hold off on the nukes. In other words, and following the theme of a “new nationalism” in South Korea founded upon a “strong and prosperous country,” progressives want a nuclear-powered, but nuclear weapons-free Korea. This position is confirmed by one of the left’s political mediums: the Hankyoreh.

The title to an April 3 English-language op-ed reads: “South Korea should reduce, not expand, reliance on nuclear power.”

The article starts off by lamenting the fact that if the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Use of Atomic Energy—the 123 Agreement—with the US expires without being amended (to allow Korea to reprocess spent fuel), then “South Korea will have trouble securing a stable supply of nuclear fuel and its nuclear power exports could be damaged,” a situation the Hankyoreh,
ergo progressives, certainly wants the Korean government to avoid. It then goes on to list the accomplishments of Korea’s indigenous nuclear energy program, saying:

…I the current agreement has failed to reflect the changing times and developing technologies. Back when it was originally signed in 1974, South Korea was building its very first commercial reactor at Kori. Now, we rank fifth in the world for nuclear power, with 23 reactors up and running. We are also trying hard to export our reactor models to countries around the world, following a landmark deal with the United Arab Emirates. The government plans to bring the number of reactors up to 34 by 2024.

Only in the second to last line of the last paragraph is it mentioned, in a rather perfunctory way, that “Obviously, the best course of action is to abandon nuclear power as an energy source.” Though it does warn against an overflow of spent fuel and the distraction that nuclear weapons-supporting conservatives are to finding a solution, the Hankyoreh does not—nor is it likely to in the future—oppose Korea’s continued use (and development) of nuclear energy as a source of power.

In fact, according to a forthcoming book on nuclear power in Korea, progressives strongly support the use of nuclear energy. Dr. Kim Jiyoon, reporting on attitudes towards nuclear power by ideological position and party affiliation, finds the assumption that conservatives are more supportive than progressives technically true, but “largely insignificant.”

It is generally reported that it is progressives who are opposed to nuclear energy. Indeed, that tendency is detected in the Korean case as well—conservatives (80.0%) are more likely than liberals [progressives] (70.9%) to support nuclear energy. However, 70.9% is still a clear-cut majority making the difference between conservatives and liberals largely insignificant. Partisan affiliation was also not much of a divider. While 84.5% of supporters of the conservative Saenuri Party approved of nuclear energy, 73.8% of supporters of the Democratic United Party (DUP)—the major opposition liberal party of Korea—agreed.36

Thus, the difference between progressives and conservatives on the issue of nuclear power is statistically insignificant; perhaps it would be better to not see progressives as those favoring alternative energy sources, as is often assumed, but simply to call support for nuclear energy (including its export) as the position of almost everyone! Of course, there is some notable divergence in opinion, such as whether Korea should use nuclear energy to build bombs, a rather extreme but notable position. In any case, though progressives (and many conservatives for that matter) may oppose the development of nuclear weapons, they do not oppose a nuclear powered strong and prosperous Korea. As the Hankyoreh argues, it is a matter of (nuclear) waste and “toilet upgrading.”

The biggest issue South Korea faces when it comes to nuclear power is how to upgrade from a conventional house without indoor plumbing to one with a modern plumbing system that can get rid of stored up waste.
Nation, State, and the Problems of Legitimacy

In most developed countries, the state and nation are understood as one, ergo the nation-state. That the nation, a group of like-minded individuals, puts its faith in the state as the institution charged with its protection and continuation ensures this link. In “full faith and trust,” as some would put it. However, due to Korea’s peculiar, though certainly not unique, situation of having one nation but two states, there is more than enough room for separation between the nation and the state. Stalwart Koreanist Brian Myers thinks so too. Myers is best known for his argument that race-based ethnic nationalism is at the root of North Korea’s ideology. In Myers’ view, North Korea has more in common with 1930s fascism than Soviet-era communism. But his use of race-based understanding of nationalism is not reserved only for the North. Myers also argues that race-based ethnic nationalism is at the root of a clear division between the nation and state in South Korea. In his words, South Korea is the “unloved republic.”

One of Myers' main points is that an absence of trust in the South Korean state has significant implications for the Republic of Korea’s North Korea policy. Myers asserts that because of the particular race-based, state-distrusting nationalism characteristic of South Koreans, provocation from the North can actually result in the strengthening of pro-Pyongyang political parties and the adoption of a less confrontational North Korean policy. In Myers’ own words: “As counterintuitive as it may sound to Americans unfamiliar with South Korean ethno-nationalism, the DPRK can more effectively strengthen South Korean parties sympathetic to the North by seeking conflict with the ROK.”

While Myers is certainly onto something—namely, that South Koreans do ascribe a relatively higher value to race than do other nations—his insistence on a clear divide between citizens and the South Korean state and the effect this divide has does not stand up to close scrutiny. Public response to recent North Korea provocations reveals an opposite trend. Although it may be a stretch to say that South Korea is the loved republic—in fact, as discussed above, distrust of political institutions runs high—gone are the days when the so-called “Northern Winds” could alter the domestic political landscape in such a way that benefits Pyongyang. It may now be folly to speak of North and South Korea as one “nation” with two states.

South Korea in 10 years: regional influence and the “problem” of confidence

In addition to the trend of permanent national divide, South Korea’s perception of itself is undergoing significant changes. Korea is a country that has depended upon others for the security of
its territorial borders for a better part of its pre-modern and modern history. Although still true to some extent, South Koreans no longer see themselves, or their country, as the proverbial “shrimp among whales.” The era of development and status as a small power has definitively closed. In a way that vindicates Alexander Gerschenkron’s argument for the “advantages of backwardness,” over the course of half a century Korea has gone from an aid-dependent, economically underdeveloped state to a fully industrialized aid-donor. Even if Koreans continue to debate whether they have become an “advanced” country there is no debating that South Korea is a powerful and influential actor in international community. And the people tend to agree. Confidence can be detected in the attitudes of South Koreans towards the current and future influence exercised by countries in the region on global affairs.

Figure 2

South Korean Perceptions of North Korea

As shown in Figure 2, the immediate observation is that South Koreans expect the influence of the United States to wane in the next ten years as China’s influence grows, with China eventually becoming the most influential among the countries included in the survey. Whereas a decrease in US staying power may have been cause for concern in the past, the new Korea thinks much differently. Aside from showing that ordinary South Koreans sense a shift in the balance of power and influence in the region, the findings also illuminate just how confident South Koreans are in “South Korea.” While Koreans ranked their country as the least influential among the countries currently, in ten years time they expect South Korea’s influence to surpass that of Japan and even to rival that of
Russia. Though significant, the meaning and implications of this finding is somewhat perplexing, especially when put into broader perspective over time; seeing Korea as more influential ought not be conflated with a concomitant rise in trust and confidence in the state. As surveys over the last 30 years indicate, trust in political institutions has decreased. Moreover, if global trends and the effects of postmodern conditions on values are correct, the likelihood of trust in political institutions increasing is unlikely. The “Northern Winds” may no longer influence political attitudes but that does not necessarily mean an increase in trust for the state. If trust in the state and deference to authority is decreasing, what are the effects on people’s perception of the link between nation and state or state and society? What do people think when they hear/say/write “South Korea?” The state, the people/nation, Korean culture, Samsung? Unfortunately, at this point, it is hard to provide a definitive answer. Nevertheless, it is important to note that South Koreans think “Korea” is more influential vis-à-vis other countries than before. What is more, insofar as the nation is concerned, data indicates an important divergence from the past. No longer is North Korea seen as part of the same nation.

The Decline of Ethnic-based Unity: North Korea as Just “Another Country”

That Koreans have a strong sense of ethno-nationalism has been taken for scripture for so long that it is rarely questioned—especially as it relates to North Korea. Many see ethno-nationalism serving as the theoretical underpinnings to the argument that “reunification by choice” will eventually take place if “reunification by collapse” does not, because Koreans of both countries are of “one blood” or are racially homogenous (tanilminjok; 단일민족). However, the latest public opinion surveys provide data that necessitate a re-thinking of this long-held view.

Figure 3 shows a breakdown of those South Koreans that view North Korea as “one of us” (uri; 우리) by age cohort from 2011 to 2013. There are three points to be made here. The most obvious observation is that in 2012, the high-water mark for the data thus far, slightly less than one-third of all South Koreans viewed North Koreans as “one of us.” Given that this connection is often cited as making reunification inevitable, one-third hardly seems like a large enough slice of the population to support such a claim. Moreover, in 2012 South Koreans were equally likely to cite North Korea simply as a “neighbor,” and 19 percent identified it as an “enemy.”

The argument put forward by Myers that Northern provocations strengthen pro-Pyongyang parties in the South goes as follows: North Korean provocations will elicit a harder-line approach
from the ROK government. Because the people distrust the state, this hard-liner approach is seen as wrong, giving rise to “pro-Pyongyang-ism.” The data from 2011 to 2012 would seem to support this line of thinking. Following the provocations of 2010, President Lee Myung-bak took a much harder-line approach to North Korea than did his immediate predecessors. After his policies took hold in 2011, there was an increased likelihood of North Korea being viewed as “one of us.” But the data does not stop in 2012. The inclusion of the 2013 data suggests—and this is the second point—that South Koreans were not reacting to the hardline policy of the Lee administration, but rather to the lack of provocations in 2011 and 2012. When there was a further provocation in 2013, South Korean public opinion turned sharply against North Korea.

Figure 3

![Influence on Global Affairs](chart.png)

Source: Asan Institute for Policy Studies

A third point suggested by the data is just how differently South Koreans in their 20s view North Korea. In each year they were the cohort least likely to cite North Korea as being “one of us,” and from 2011 to 2012 there was only a 5pp increase. In fact, in 2012 this cohort was more likely to cite North Korea as an enemy (24%). Among all other cohorts, this increase averaged 12pp. Following the heightened inter-Korean tensions in the first quarter of 2013, their collective skepticism was confirmed, and positive views of North Korea collapsed, not only for those in their 20s but across all age cohorts.

In addition to a decline in “oneness” between North and South Korea, there has been a concomitant decline in support of unification. Technical and political difficulties aside, support for or against unification is a good analogous measure of attitudes regarding the nation; that is, a relatively higher support for unification indicates national (meaning north-south) solidarity, whereas lower support indicates disassociation—North and South Korea as distinct and separate states.
nations. Whereas older generations have long supported efforts at unification, divergent material conditions and fundamentally different environments for socialization have produced divergent attitudes. Consider the opinion of Mr. Choi, a 36-year old officer worker with a young child:

“Originally, we were one nation. But now that we’ve lived apart for so long, we in the South don’t really see the people in the North as the same… It’s not that I don’t relate to the problems of the people of the North, or don’t care. In the South, we do really want to help the North Korean people. But we have our own economic crisis here. We have our own problems to solve. 44

Whereas in times past “we” would have meant both North and South Korea, now “we” is used much more to in reference to South Korea/Koreans. Although “interest”45 in unification remains high, actual support for unification is ambivalent, at best. In the latest polling at the time of writing, more than sixty percent do not believe South Korea is capable of dealing politically, socially, and economically with sudden unification. Interestingly, those ages 19-29 were represented the age group with the largest proportion (45.5%) who did not see the need to assist North Korea (those in their 30s were recorded at 38.9 percent). Nearly half (50%) of all respondents do not think the benefits will outweigh the costs and less than 40 percent (38.6%) believe it will.46 As indicated above, there seems to be significant shifts in the way the South Koreans, especially young adults, see North Korea vis-à-vis the South.

In addition to shifts in elite and popular opinion, South Korean civil society, long known for its highly contentious relationship to the state, has reoriented itself in a way befitting a postmodern society: a de-emphasis on the state and a increased emphasis on productive civic engagement.

From Survival to Helping Others Survive: Aiding Refugees and IDPs

In a 2012 report on global trends, the UN refugee agency UNHCR pointed to no fewer than 7.6 million people newly displaced by conflict or persecution in just one year, and the creation of more than a million new refugees.47 2012 is acknowledged as an exceptional year in the context of new refugees and IDPs, but the high figures only add fresh urgency to the issue of 45 million refugees or displaced persons worldwide. Moreover, UNHCR data reveals the existence of more than 35 million people deemed worthy of concern, implying immense potential for global instability to be caused by refugees and IDP flows. South Korea does not appear to be an important actor in this particular arena. The country is currently home to a statistically insignificant proportion of the existing refugee total (487 according to the UNHCR report cited above), and has just 1,548 outstanding asylum-seeker cases (in stark contrast, Germany has more than 85,000, and France almost 50,000).
Nevertheless, the government in Seoul is acutely aware of the latent potential for instability that is inherent in this global issue. UNHCR statistics underplay South Korean involvement in refugee issues because they do not take into account the constant trickle of refugees fleeing from North Korea. UNHCR does so because North Korean refugees automatically receive South Korean citizenship. Refugees arriving from North Korea are also eligible for substantive resettlement funding and other state assistance such as housing. Thus, one can say that North Koreans arriving in South Korea are given extremely privileged access to the resources of state when compared with refugees elsewhere. However, the germane question of how best to address the resettlement and integration of refugees is ever-present.

Moreover, North Korean citizens who wish to resettle in South Korea have to transit through at least one, and usually three, countries en route, turning the problem into a much larger one. Most refugees attempt to reach Thailand, which has both a positive relationship with the government of South Korea and a well-established system for processing incoming North Korean refugees and sending them onward to Seoul. Other countries in the region are relatively more ambivalent toward the new arrivals, as the 2013 case of a group of nine young North Koreans deported back to North Korea through China by the government of the Laos People’s Democratic Republic shows.48 Quite aside from the vagaries of state policy, the process of transit toward resettlement in South Korea through a twilight zone of uncertain citizenship is also ripe with opportunities for exploitations. All these issues present the outward-looking South Korean state with valuable expertise in coping with refugee flows, and push South Korean civil society to enter the transnational space where this human rights problem plays itself out.

**Bottom-up change: South Korean civil society and the Refugee Act**

In its last plenary session of 2011, South Korea’s National Assembly passed the “Law on the Status and Treatment of Refugees” (Refugee Act hereafter). It was the first independent refugee law passed at the national-level in Asia. As such, it indicates the extent to which South Korea has positioned itself to deal with refugee flows in the region. The passage of the Refugee Act was the cumulative effect of several interacting forces: the pressure towards convergence from international institutions and norms; the South Korean government’s commitment to a “global” agenda; and, most significantly, bottom-up pressure from Korean civil society working in tandem with domestic legal organizations and international institutions through domestic and regional networks.
In the latter half of the 20th century, as Korea’s export-oriented industrialization (EOI) and favorable trading relations began paying huge dividends, Korea found itself quickly approaching the threshold that divides newly industrialized countries (NIC) from fully developed countries. As a country relatively more concerned with its global image than others, international norms and the roles associated with developed countries have, arguably, a greater impact on South Korea’s domestic and foreign policies than in other countries. In September of 1991 Korea became a United Nations member state and shortly thereafter joined the 1951 UNHCR Refugee Convention, which defines refugees and their rights. In 1996, South Korea ascended the ranks of the world’s most developed countries when it joined the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). In its quest for international recognition as an “advanced” country, South Korea began to portray itself as a country concerned with humanitarian assistance to refugees. And in 2000 Korea became a member of the UNHCR Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, an international body comprised of member states with an “interest in, and devotion to, the solution of the refugee problem.”

Korea’s economic ascent and its successful efforts to improve its position within international and regional networks represent the backdrop upon which the Refugee Law was passed. A state-centric, top-down perspective shows a global Korea whose elites are concerned with addressing transnational issues. Such a view, however, would be both misleading and overshadow the instrumental role played by civil organizations and other non-governmental institutions. Though government and political elites may be status conscious, they are not nearly as concerned with ground-level implementation; as politicians and statespeople, they are often constrained by broader political and strategic concerns. In their research on Korea’s progress as a host country for refugees, Hanns Schattle and Jennifer McCann find that change is largely bottom-up. Though the elites may have changed the discourse, “The main thrust of national-level policy change has come from South Korea’s vibrant civil society.” In fact, after signing of the Refugee Convention, “the government did nothing to advance its position on refugees at home.”

Korea’s rhetoric-policy disconnect is similar to Japan’s contribution-policy divide, known alternatively as “checkbook diplomacy.” In 2011, Japan contributed more than $200 million to the UNHCR, yet its refugee policies were (and remain) woefully underdeveloped. In Korea, the small number of asylum seekers that have been granted refugee status highlights the divide between discourse and official policy. It was not until 2001 that Korea granted an Eritrean man refugee status. Though more have been granted since then, the process is still seen as prohibitively cumbersome and
inefficient. More than the government’s ostensible commitment to a “global” agenda, the “mounting pressure by lawyers and activists who have taken an interest in advocating for refugees as well as other segments of the country’s growing migrant population by drawing on international human rights law” has set the country moving in a direction towards accommodating refugees. It is at the intersection of international laws and norms and bottom-up pressure from South Korean civil organizations that Korea’s potential as a leading actor in a complex transnational network emerges.

There are two networks that have developed within the last decades to address the issue of refugees: one mainly domestic and oriented towards national-level priorities and the other regional in scope. The “Refugee Aid Network,” a loose association of Refugee NGOs and legal outfits, represents the domestic network. This network was responsible for writing and submitting the original Refugee Act legislation to the National Assembly. Sometimes referred to in the literature as the “Refugee NGO Network,” this association of NGO activists and human rights lawyers began meeting informally once a month in 2006. Built on the early efforts of NGO activist Lee Ho-taeg, founder of Refugee pNan, and his close associates Choi Won-geun, founder of the refugee advocacy group NANCEN, and Kim Hee-jin, director of Amnesty International, Seoul office, most of the civil and legal organizations involved early on were associated with refugee advocacy through personal contacts. The group would eventually come to include Hwang Pill-kyu, a public interest lawyer at Gong-gam who was largely responsible for writing the refugee bill, and Kim Jong-chul, another public interest lawyer who eventually joined pNan.

As an “informal networked society,” personal relationships and associations outside institutional frameworks are often more important in South Korea than in other countries. However, by the end of 2007, the loose association of activists and lawyers had become a recognized, semi-formal network that eventually included both conservative and progressive civil society groups, in addition to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea, the Ministry of Justice, and Assemblyman Hwang Woo-yeo (the Refugee Act’s sponsor in the National Assembly). In other words, a civil-society networked strategy had succeed in institutionalizing the Refugee Aid Network—a notable feat for a civil society better known for its militant street-mentality and highly contentious relationship with the government. Although most of the network is constituted by domestic organizations, the various civil and legal organizations in the Refugee Aid Network work closely with Amnesty International, UNHCR, and the National Human Rights Commission of Korea. In fact, when the drafting of the new law began in 2009, the UNHCR, at the request of civil and legal groups in Korea, provided advice and detailed comments on ways the bill could be improved.
The second network is the Asia Pacific Refugee Rights Network (APRRN). Founded in 2008 at the first Asia Pacific Consultation on Refugee Rights (APCRR) in Kuala Lumpur, the APRRN is a regional forum through which 116 civil society groups from 21 different Asian Pacific countries (including the UK and the US) meet to exchange ideas and information and partake in mutual capacity building and joint advocacy efforts. In addition to conferences and meetings, APRRN members are given the opportunity to receive specific legal and medical training and apply for logistical and travel support. Korea has eight member organizations in APRRN, six of which are currently, or were at some point in the past, also members of the Refugee Aid Network. Through the APRRN network, civil organizations can network with other regional member organizations—or with civil society groups from the same country. In fact, it was the APRRN network that helped strengthen the Korea-centered Refugee Aid Network.

In a discussion about the APRRN network, Lee Ho-taeg emphasized the importance of regional and thematic working groups within the APRRN for organizational networking. He accredits the East Asia Working Group—a regional working group comprised of civil organizations from Korea, Japan, Thailand, and Hong Kong—with “giving Korea a sense of responsibility.” Although the East Asia regional working group did not directly support the Refugee Aid Networks efforts in writing and submitting the Refugee Act, they indirectly aided their efforts by “setting expectations for the Korea network and thus holding us to account.” Before the passage of the Refugee Act, one such regional working group meeting took place in September 2010 on the campus of Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea. With support from the Toyota Foundation, members of the East Asia Working Group, the director of legal studies at Yonsei University, the Representative of UNHCR Korea, and other core members of the Refugee Aid Network met to report on the status of refugee protection in East Asia and the role played by civil society in promoting the rights of refugees. Further efforts at network building have been made since then. In August of 2012, the APRRN hosted the “Fourth Asia Pacific Consultation on Refugee Rights.” With a scope going behind the regional working group level, this conference brought together specialists from all over Asia. According to Lee, it was these sorts of meetings that strengthened the Refugee Aid Network’s resolve and made it clear to the Korean members that, given their structural and network position, they would be the ones taking the lead within the regional network.
Conclusion

The significant political, social, and economic changes that have taken place in modern South Korea have precipitated a shift in values seemingly consistent with global trends. In a way befitting for South Korea, all of this has taken place in a short time span. In any country, the environments in which people are socialized differ form generation to generation; however, in South Korea it is fair and safe to say that the difference between any two generations is far greater than the mean. The generational effects, as preliminary investigations by Auh Soo Young indicate, seem to be lasting as they have been elsewhere. However, the link between structure and society and the process of socialization is complex. The interaction between structure and individual, individual and state, and state and society are difficult to trace; to find the mechanism of change is an even more difficult task. Casual inference is a difficult thing to prove. This research, however, does not attempt to isolate the key variables that explain the variation in national identity and policy preferences. As such, it does not purport to pass the strict standards set by research design specialists and social scientists for causal inference. It is, rather, a preliminary foray into the realm of plausibility.

The tentative conclusions presented here show that noteworthy changes have taken place in an era of “strength and prosperity.” As data presented here show, a significant shift in the way South Koreans see South Korea vis-à-vis other countries in the region and they way they identify themselves in relation to North Korea has changed. Koreans see their nation and possibly the state as powerful and influential and, contrary to times past, distinctively separate from North Korea; ethno-nationalism no longer influences national identity like it once did. Importantly, many of these shifts are seen most drastically amongst the younger voting cohort (perennially the largest cohort of post-materialists). Structural changes have also altered the nature of civil society-state relations. Following the trends of other postmodern states, South Korea civil society has reoriented itself towards more civic engagement; the civil society-lead effort towards refugee policy reform is a case-in-point. Overall, the new nationalism in South Korea has significant implications for the prospects for unification as well as South Korean domestic and foreign policies and, given South Korea’s increasing regional and international importance, will likely to be the subject of forthcoming research efforts—beginning with this one.
End Notes

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid., 239.
8 Ibid., 237.
12 Ibid., 307.
15 Roh Tae-woo, the first elected president of the sixth republic was a key official in Chung Doo-hwan’s authoritarian administration. It is well known that Roh only won the presidency because the opposition was split between centrist Kim Young-sam and long-time opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung.
16 See Google Public Data, GDP per capita. (current US$), for Korea, Rep..
17 See Google Public Data, GDP per capita. (current US$), for Korea, Rep..
19 Ibid., 315.
20 Defined as: executive branches, parliament, judicial systems, the police, and the military.
21 Inglehart, “Postmodernization Erodes Support for Authority,” 242.
22 Auh’s “retirement” was made aware to the author in an email communiqué.


25 North Korea’s official policy of dual economic and nuclear development. See the source in footnote 21 for more.


27 This is certainly not a “new” position; conservatives, Park Chung-hee amongst them, were supportive of a nuclear-armed South Korea. See: Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon, “Park Chung Hee, the CIA, and the Bomb”, NAPSNet Special Reports, September 23, 2011, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/park-chung-hee-theoria-and-the-bomb/.


29 See, for example, the response from the conservative *Chosun Ilbo* following North Korea’s third nuclear test in Steven Denney and Christopher Green, “A Nuclear Hangover: South Korean Editorial Roundup,” *Sino-NK*, February 12, 2013, http://sinonk.com/2013/02/12/a-nuclear-hangover-south-korean-editorial-roundup/.


32 It should be noted, however, that this figure declines during periods of lower inter-Korean tension. Moreover, it has been noted that if the full implications of South Korea acquiring its own bomb are made, people become significantly less supportive. The point is to emphasize the response to a provocation by North Korea; contemporary responses differ greatly from those of the past.


34 This position can be easily ascertained through a guided reading of print (and digital) media. Media is to Korea what political parties are to America. To get a sense of what the Korean right thinks on an issue, it is best to read the *Dong-a Ilbo*, the *Joongahn Ilbo*, and *Chosun Ilbo* (and follow Chosun media more generally); the *Hankyoreh* and the *Kyunghyan Shinmun* are good sources to get a sense of the progressive/liberal position on any given issue.

35 This title, however, is somewhat misleading (though not entirely inaccurate). The title to the Korean version (published on April 2), reads: “The Korea-US Atomic Energy Agreement and the debate to arm Korea with

The actual content (identical in both versions) is more in-line with the title of the Korean version. See the English version at: http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/581072.html.

36 Chapter 8, “Public Opinions on Nuclear Power in Korea.” In Korea’s Nuclear Future (Seoul: Asan Institute, 2013). (Forthcoming)


40 It should be emphasized, however, that the literature covering the modern phenomena of the state, the nation, and nationalism attributes some (though often not much) significance to race and ethnicity in the formation of nationalism, i.e. a nation’s love for the state. For one example see: Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History and Ideology,” in Becoming National: A Reader, Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, eds. (Oxford University Press, 1996), 132-150. Balibar, who identifies language and ethnicity as the two primary variables, would fall into the “much significance” group.

41 The word used in Korean for “advanced country” is better understood as an aspiration for Koreans: a source of motivation rather than something that can be achieved.

42 Future influence means “ten years from now.”

43 Aside from the data provided in the table, see also: Kim, Jiyoon and Karl Friedhoff. “South Korea in a Changing World: Foreign Affairs,” The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 2013.


54 Interview with Lee Ho-taeg, founder of Refugee pNan, July 17, 2013.


56 Access the APRRN website at: http://www.aprrn.info/1/.

57 Interview with Lee Ho-taeg, July 17, 2013.


59 Interview with Lee Ho-taeg, July 17, 2013.